Running Head: ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Cannie Stark, Ph.D., Director

Organizational and Social Psychology Research Unit

Professor of Psychology

University of Regina

Regina, Saskatchewan

S4S 0A2

starkc@uregina.ca

Canadian Psychology, 38(4), (1997), 232-237.

Because it is believed to be necessary for an unfettered pursuit of knowledge, academic freedom is a treasured, almost sacred, tenet and expectation in post-secondary education institutions in North America. With this freedom, however, come a number of responsibilities. In addition to these responsibilities psychologists have an obligation to conduct their academic affairs within ethical boundaries. Underlying most ethical constructs is the principle of avoiding harm to others. Unfortunately, "Political Correctness" has become a pejorative label--even when used to describe acts of courtesy, respect, fairness, openness, sensitivity to diversity, and responsibility for the consequences of one's behaviour. These characteristics represent ethical values that should promote, rather than stifle, open inquiry and the pursuit of knowledge without resulting in an erosion of standards of excellence in favour of special interest groups. It is argued that academic freedom carries ethical responsibilities compatible with the pursuit of knowledge, that the ethical pursuit of knowledge involves integrity in relationships as well as responsibility to society, and that academics are not harmed by what some label "politically correct" behaviour.

Academic freedom is a very precious--if somewhat illusory--concept, vital to effective functioning within the hallowed halls of academe (Stark-Adamec, 1992). It is something we do not have: if we work for industry and conduct our research in that context; if we work for a hospital without an academic appointment; if we work for government; if we work as an independent scholar; or if we do contract research. That is, in each of these instances we may have some freedom to ask whatever research questions we want, and perhaps even to conclude whatever we want; but we do not have the freedom to tell anyone else about it. In fact, in those environments we can get in serious trouble if we "go public" with the results of our honest search for knowledge.

But, in academia, we are protected from dismissal procedures that are initiated solely on the basis that we hold and voice dissenting, controversial, outlandish, or near-psychotic views. We are protected by academic freedom, as first articulated in the United States at the turn of the century (Malloch, 1987), popularized in the 1940s (Poch, 1993), and as defined by the Canadian Association of University Teachers as the freedom "to teach, investigate and speculate without deference to prescribed doctrine".

On the face of it, this principle is easy to endorse, to espouse, and to defend. As with most simple statements, it is rather more complex when you get down to specifics and their application. As a result, there may be some misunderstanding regarding the entitlements associated with academic freedom. It does not mean that we can do whatever we want and say whatever we want and write whatever we want whenever we want.

As Malloch (1987) has pointed out, there are " . . . factors which condition the exercise of academic freedom, and in conditioning its exercise, they necessarily impose limits" (p. 10). For instance:

Furthermore, "the individual faculty member's academic freedom will . . . be conditioned by the immediate context of the academic unit in which he or she holds appointment" (Malloch, 1987, p. 10). So, for instance, our freedom is conditioned by the nature of our teaching assignments: the subject matter of our courses; the size of the enrollment; regulations concerning evaluation; duration of the semester; timetable and so on. And there are conditioning elements beyond our teaching assignments, such as: "laboratory and library facilities, the availability of research grants, the academic support services available, and all those factors comprehended in the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment'." (Malloch, 1987, p. 10).

So there are limits on academic freedom. But Malloch's concern--one which I am sure we all share--is that what he calls "conditioning factors" can be abused ". . . so as to transform acceptable limits into unacceptable limitations" (p. 11). Thus,

Some object to what they perceive as the politicization of the academic enterprise (although, as Cornford [1908] has pointed out, academia has ever been ripe and rife with politics). They seem to perceive "political correctness" as contributing to the erosion of scholarly excellence, as resulting in the recruitment of faculty on the basis of the ethnicity and sex of the candidate rather than on their merit, as a limitation of enquiry on controversial topics, and as a constraint on acceptable teaching strategies. According to Cheney (1992a, 1992b), Kimura (1994), Kurzweil (1992), Fekete (1993-94) and a number of vocal others, our academic freedom is threatened by what has been called "political correctness". These perceptions alone require that the concept and practice of political correctness be examined.

According to Droge (1992), political correctness--or "politically correct"--has become an all-purpose pejorative epithet conflating and condemning a number of initiatives--such as affirmative action in hiring and admissions, multicultural education, broadening the "canon" of classical texts to include women and minority groups, protests against unpopular, usually conservative ideas, and changing vocabularies for representing particular groups.

There may be resentment, on the part of some, that they are now being required to "watch their language" (verbal and non-verbal), lest they "offend" or make someone "uncomfortable". Such resentment, sometimes accompanied by comments like "Where's your sense of humour?", or allusions to political correctness "merely" being "in the eye of the beholder", trivialize the import and impact of the issues of respect for the dignity and welfare of others, respect for diversity, and avoidance of humiliation and cruelty.

It is odd that the term would take on a pejorative meaning. Why is it an effective insult? On the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the term "correct"--except, perhaps, that it implies rules and standards. By the same token, there is nothing much wrong with "correctness" either: perhaps it sounds a bit "stuffy", reminding one of terms like "correctitude"--which is even "stuffier"; but basically we used to take it as positive reinforcement when someone told us that we were "correct". No, the culprit that turns it into an insult must be the word "political"--perhaps because we distrust politicians (a distrust that some would say they have earned), or perhaps because "political" implies "expediency" rather than reasoned commitment. Indeed, two of the English meanings of "politician" are "schemer" and "intriguer".

As Yitsch (1993) has pointed out, at first blush it does not seem to make sense to yoke together power (political) and equity (correctness) in the same phrase--it sounds like an oxymoron. But "correctness, power, and equity are royally related"--first through the Latin verb regere, regens, regent, which means to rule or to make straight, and then through the Latin corregere, to correct or to straighten together.

So the term--correctly used--is almost redundant. The expression--when used properly--"should carry happy and positive connotations" (Yitsch, 1993). But it does not. And (according to Yitsch) it does not to the extent that those who pepper their remarks with it usually mean exactly the opposite of what they say: they mean political incorrectness, also mistake, hidden agenda, incompetence, doom, corruption" (p. 23)--which may be the spectre of the politician's ugly head rising again.

The use of the term political correctness as an epithet thus results, or attempts to result, in trivialization of serious issues and invalidation of injustices experienced by particular populations.

I have a further concern on the opposite side of the academic freedom coin. I am concerned about the faculty member who abuses academic freedom, who interprets it to mean freedom from responsibility, who turns academic freedom into academic license.

In his Report for Concordia University, Cowan states:

One of the more controversial Canadian documents available on the topic of political correctness in academia is the 1993 Ontario Ministry of Education and Training's Framework Regarding Prevention of Harassment and Discrimination in Ontario Universities. Negative reaction to this 10-page document and to the Ontario Government's policy on zero tolerance of harassment and discrimination was swift and vocal; Hornosty (1995) has provided an excellent analysis and interpretation of these events.

Perhaps the most contentious of the four areas in which the Ministry recommends that universities develop policies is what was referred to as a "negative environment or climate" (p. 4), defined as follows:

Whether or not there is a so-called "chilly climate" for women in universities is no longer a matter of debate. What is clear from the data (see, for example, Epp, 1994; Granger, 1993; Kelly, 1993; Stark[-Adamec], 1995b) is that some women appear to be luxuriating in the tropics--they have never experienced discrimination or other forms of sexism or, at least, they are unaware of having been treated differentially in a negative fashion; on the other hand, a great many others are contending with a windchill factor that freezes exposed psyches in under 30 seconds; for some, the chilly climate may feel like a new Ice Age (Stark, 1997b). To say that it is not a level playing field is to understate the case: we are not even playing the same "game". The climate in our work/study environment is not only chilly, it is violent--physically violent at times, but rather consistently psychologically violent, psychologically toxic (Stark[-Adamec], 1995a).

One of the limits within which academic freedom must be exercised--not mentioned by Malloch, perhaps because it would seem to be self-evident or obvious--is surely that of the ethics of the discipline, of the university, and of the society in which the academic functions. There are those who contend that ethical behaviour is nothing more than good manners, e.g., "L'étiquette, c'est le lubrifiant des rapports humain, l'ourlet du tissu social, le ^<<pshitt^>> ultime de parfum sur le corps collectif" (Bazzo, 1995, p. 17). Although there are some similarities between ethics and etiquette, the Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists (Sinclair & Pettifor, 1992) and the Social Science Federation of Canada Ethical Guidelines (Stark[-Adamec] & Pettifor, 1995) go beyond providing perfumed oil to decrease friction in interpersonal dealings. It seems to me that underlying both of these educational documents are the ancient Greek directives that are sometimes attributed to Hippocrates, viz., First do no harm, and where possible, Be of benefit--both of which require acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of one's actions.

As psychologists we not only have a responsibility to demonstrate integrity in our research and teaching--we have a responsibility to demonstrate integrity in relationships and we have a responsibility to society. Many of the instances of political incorrectness--when not outright illegal--are perfect examples of lack of integrity in research and teaching, lack of integrity in relationships, and failure to meet our responsibility to society (for examples, see the other articles in this Special Issue and Stark[-Adamec] & Pettifor, 1995, Sections D-F). As illustrated in Figure 1, these are some of the key ingredients in the harmful "recipe for academic violence" (Stark, 1996).

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Figure 1. Recipe for Academic Violence

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What I see as the systemic or organizational ingredients that contribute to psychological violence in the academic context are: (a) a sub-cultural belief that competition is good, that stress hones the personality, and that Darwin was right: it's survival of the fittest and it's a jungle in here in academia; (b) a rule-oriented organizational culture; (c) a quantity-driven production orientation inappropriately imported from the corporate or commercial sector of society; and (d) a blind faith in peer review (Stark, 1997a). What I see as the consequences of these organizational factors are: (a) an increased competition for what are perceived as ever-scarcer resources; leading to (b) a very powerful fear of "loss of place and face"; which in turn leads to (c) fear-based aggression, territoriality, and the inevitable protection of turf (and, of course, fear-based aggression is very difficult to deal with). What I see as maintaining this psychological violence are the facts that: (a) this aggression gives one a sense of power and of control; (b) it is tolerated, condoned, and actually rewarded within the system; and (c) desirable behaviour is not taught, modelled, or rewarded.

Without pretending to understand why particular individuals behave the way they do, an analysis of the contexts in which less-than-professional or less-than-scholarly and hence less-than-ethical behaviours occur can assist us in modifying the undesirable behaviour. It is not necessary and, indeed, is unethical, to bake our academic cake using the recipe for disaster.

If, as suggested by our Code of Ethics, our focus is on avoiding harm, we should be asking who--if anyone--is harmed by political incorrectness?

First, it should be noted that although political correctness is often framed as a feminist issue it is not a women's issue exclusively; but it does seem that most of the victims of political incorrectness just happen to be women. When academic freedom is interpreted as the right to be abusive (e.g., by Fekete, 1993-94) it is arguable that both the abuser and the target of the psychological violence are harmed. When academic freedom is interpreted as the right to discriminate against those with whom you disagree--or against those who you do not understand--not only is the target of the discrimination subject to economic injury, but the resulting monolithic ideology harms the disciplines involved, the institutions that pay us to satisfy our intellectual curiosity and, ultimately, society. (See Schultz, 1993, Trachtenberg, 1993, and Byrne, 1993 for discussions of the importance of diversity in academia and the possible resulting enrichment of our enterprises; see Fullinwider, 1993, for a discussion of "charity for all" in the context of the ethics of argument.)

On the other side of the coin, we must also ask who is harmed by political correctness? The short answer is: no one. Like the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Young Offenders Act, our Constitution, our Welfare Acts, Medicare, and even academic freedom and our criteria for hiring, tenure, and promotion, it is the abuses of political correctness that cause harm.

However, improper use of the term "political correctness"--as an epithet or as invective--diminishes the target as a person, invalidates their perceptions and concerns, and trivializes the issues of social justice, respect for the dignity and welfare of others, and avoidance of harm.

According to Yitsch (1993), "political correctness has deconstructed itself to the point that it has no conventional meaning. It has turned into a joke, a linguistic clown that easily wears whatever moral mask you want it to wear. . . . Political correctness rather neatly illustrates the power games that language allows people to play" (p. 25). But there is no need to play these destructive power games and no need to bake our academic cake with the recipe for disaster.

Debates on this issue are often punctuated with hyperbole and hysteria. Media representations portray it as an organized movement that threatens free speech and the foundation of American society (Shelton, 1994). One needs to be skeptical of the rhetoric and look, instead, for substance.

In summary, academic freedom carries ethical responsibilities that are compatible with the pursuit of knowledge. The ethical pursuit of knowledge involves integrity in relationships as well as responsibility to society. "Truly correct" behaviour is based on ethics of respect and caring in relationships. The term "politically correct" corrupts and transforms the ethic of integrity in relationships into externally-imposed rules that inappropriately restrict the behaviour of academics. I ask that you take action to restore an ethical culture and "truly correct" behaviour to the academy. As Cornford put it:

Bazzo, M-F. (1995). Parole de femme. enRoute, April, 17-18.

Byrne, J.P. (1993). Academic freedom and political neutrality in Law Schools: An essay on structure and ideology in professional education. Journal of Legal Education, 43(3), 315-345.

Cheney, L.V. (1992a). Telling the truth: A report on the state of the humanities in higher education. Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Humanities. (monograph)

Cheney, L.V. (1992b). Telling the truth: A report on the state of the humanities in higher education. Humanities, 13(5), 4-9.

Cornford, F.M. (1908). Microcosmographia academica: Being a guide for the young academic politician. London (UK): Bowes & Bowes.

Cowan, J.S. (1994). Lessons from the Fabrikant file: A Report to the Board of Governors of Concordia University. Montreal, Quebec.

Droge, D. (1992). The five dogs of politically correct speech on campus. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Kenneth Burke Society, Western States Communication Association, Boise, ID, February 21-25.

Epp, J.R. (1994). Women's perceptions of graduate level educational administration programs. Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 24(2), 43-67.

Fekete, J. (December 1993-January 1994). On free inquiry and expression: A public statement. Peterborough, Ont.: Trent University.

Granger, M.W. (1993). A review of the literature on the status of women and minorities in the professoriate in higher education. Journal of School Leadership, 3(2), 121-135.

Fullinwider, R.K. (1993). "With malice toward none; with charity for all": Some reflections on the ethics of argument. Journal of Education, 175(2), 99-112.

Hornosty, J. (1995). A look at faculty fears and needed university policies against violence and harassment. In C. Stark(-Adamec) (Ed.), Violence: A collective responsibility. Ottawa: Social Science Federation of Canada, pp. 31-56.

Kelly, J.W. (May 1993). Women in academe: Historical and sociological perspectives. Presented at the Annual Convention of the Eastern Communication Association, New Haven CT.

Kimura, D. (1994). On protecting academic freedom. Civic Arts Review, 6(3-4), 20, 19.

Kurzweil, E. (Ed.)(1992). Education beyond politics. Partisan Review, 59(3), 343-419.

Malloch, A. (1987). Academic freedom and its limits. In M. Horn (Ed.), Proceedings, Academic Freedom Conference Harry Crowe Memorial Lecture Series 1986 (pp. 6-16), Toronto: York University.

Ontario Ministry of Education and Training (1993). Framework regarding prevention of harassment and discrimination in Ontario universities. Toronto: Author.

Poch, R.K. (1993). Academic freedom in American higher education: Rights, responsibilities and limitations. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 4. Washington, DC: George Washington University.

Shelton, M.W. (1994). PC, No—An examination of the conservative opposition to political correctness. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western States Communication Association. San Jose, CA, February 23-27, 1994.

Schultz, D.L. (and others) (1993). To reclaim a legacy of diversity: Analyzing the "Political Correctness" debates in higher education. New York, NY: National Council for Research on Women.

Sinclair, C. & Pettifor, J. (1992). Companion Manual to the Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists, 1991. Ottawa: Canadian Psychological Association.

Stark, C. (August, 1996). Ethical relationships and the conduct of social science. Presented at the XXVIth International Congress of Psychology, Montreal.

Stark, C. (1997a). Curiouser and curiouser: Blind faith in blind review. Canadian Psychology, 38(2a), 25.

Stark, C. (June, 1997b). Feminist networks in the New Ice Age. Presented at the Learned Societies Meetings, St. John's, Nfld.

Stark-Adamec, C. (1992). Sexism in research: The limits of academic freedom. Women & Therapy, 12(4), 103-111.

Stark(-Adamec), C. (1995a). Psychological violence in academia. In C. Stark(-Adamec) (Ed.), Violence: A collective responsibility. Ottawa: Social Science Federation of Canada, pp. 21-29.

Stark(-Adamec), C. (1995b). Women's ways of working: Rocking the boat and the cradle in academia. Research-based policy recommendations. Women, work, and stress: Developing mechanisms for change by bridging the gap between research and policy. Special Issue of the WINning edge, December 1995, 1-29.

Stark(-Adamec), C. & Pettifor, J. (1995). Ethical decision making for practising social scientists: Putting values into practice. Ottawa: Social Science Federation of Canada.

Trachtenberg, S.J. (1993). Political correctness: Can it ever be politically incorrect? College Board Review, (Winter 1993, 165), 6-11, 26.

Yitsch, B. (1993). Political correctness (or, How to fish and cut bait). Women's Education des femmes, 10(2), 22-25.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Canadian Psychological Association Convention in Charlottetown, P.E.I. (June 1995) and published in the WINning edge (Special Issue 2, March 1996). The data referred to in this article were collected with financial assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Strategic Grant 428-88-0005). Figure 1 is adapted from a symposium presentation at the International Congress of Psychology (Stark, 1996). My thanks to Dr. Heather Stark who, when I was a Department Head, sent me Cornford's valuable 1908 treatise from England. The assistance provided by Dr. Jean Pettifor, and by Darren Mondor, Cameron Norman, and Douglas Thomson is also gratefully acknowledged.